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Communis Error Facit Jus
As a general rule, a maxim resembles a small-scale
map in that important details are necessarily omitted by
reason of its narrow compass. The ifs, whenevers, wherevers, buts, provided thats, and other modifiers are crowded out for the practical reasons that no memory would
charge itself with such labyrinthine details, and no human
foresight could anticipate the requirements of such an attempted formula on account of the never ceasing changes
in the factual requirements of human affairs. Even the six
honest servingmen of Kipling's verse would find such an
undertaking to be beyond their powers. In view of the
almost harsh provisions of our law on the subject of mistake of law, it sounds somewhat inconsistent to say that
common error makes law; and if the maxim were applied
literally to the familiar ignorantia legis neminem excusat, it
would establish the proposition that ignorance of the existence of a common error as to the law excuses no one. Unfortunately for lovers of paradoxes, both maxims have their
recognized exceptions; and fortunately for the development of our legal system the word "sometimes" is implied
in the translation of the title of this paper. The principle is one that should be used with caution. In many
cases the context of the opinions shows that it is employed
as a make-weight-a convenient excuse for the avoidance
of a revision of legal theory which might lead to disastrous
results such as unsettling property or contract rights. Occasionally the aphorism is lightly used as a rhetorical embellishment as in a case wherein it was mistakenly applied
to a mutual error of parties litigant.
It is submitted that in its inception common error is
"law taken for granted," to borrow the phrase of Lord
Denham. In the case of O'Connell v. The Queen, the distinguished judge, in refusing to follow an opinion of the
I11 C1. & F. 155, 37Z-373 (1844).
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legal profession based on a dictum of Lord Mansfield, observed:
I am tempted to take this opportunity of observing that a large portion of that legal opinion which
has passed current for law, falls within the description
of "law taken for granted". If a statistical table of
legal propositions should be drawn out, and the first
column headed "Law by Statute," and the second,
"Law by Decision," a third column, under the heading
of "Law taken for granted," would comprise as much
matter as both the others combined. But when, in
pursuit of truth, we are obliged to investigate the
grounds of the law, it is plain, and has often 'been'
proved by recent experience, that the mere statement
and restatement of a doctrine,-the mere repetition of
the catilena of lawyers cannot make it law, unless it can
be traced to some competent authority, and if it be
irreconcilable to some clear legal principle.
The dissenting opinion of Lord Brougham 2 presents
another angle of the problem and expresses a view which
is frequently followed. He asks,
...How much of the known and admitted law of
this country in which the books abound and by which
the Courts are guided, would be struck out and cease
to rule us, were all struck out on which no decision has
ever been formally pronounced? A doctrine may be
without any decision to support it expressly, because it
never has been denied; it may rest on no cases but on
the common understanding of the Profession, precisely
because it never has been brought into doubt.
In a measure, application of the principle of common
error amounts to an adoption of custom, although not to
so great an extent as in Scotland and in the old Spanish
law. In the former country, custom opposed to the enforcement of a statute is said to have carried so much
weight, (at least in former times), as to cause written law
2

1b. p. 355.
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to become inoperative through desuetude; while in the
latter system it was the law that ctstom may repeal or
alter anterior law.3 ' So firmly rooted was this practice in
Spanish law that some jurisdictions have felt it necessary
to repeal it by direct enactment, as in Argentine where it
is provided that "Laws cannot be repealed, either in whole
or in part, except by other laws. Usage, custom or practice cannot create rights, unless the laws make reference
thereto.'

4

Returning to Anglo-American law-it is fairly well
established at the present time, that in order for custom to
become law, it must first receive the sanction of judicial
decision;5 and this is especially true where it is sought to
be established that law has been made by common error.6
Lord Denham's position that custom or usage does not become recognized as law prior to its formulation by judicial
authority, is probably accepted in all common law jurisdictions. It is to be noted that the distinguished jurist
does not assert that all doctrines should be "struck out on
which no decision has ever been formally pronounced," nor
does he deny that a doctrine which has no decision to support it may subsequently be adjudged law without judicial
precedent, as was the case in Birkley v. Presgrave,7 where a
tacit acquiescence by a community as to the existence of a
right was deemed a decisive factor in determining litigation
for which there was no judicial precedent. Mr. Justice
Storey took a similar position in the case of Manchester v.
Hough," where he held that universal usage affecting titles
to land constituted "a case in which the doctrine might be
fairly applied, that commurnis error facit jus." To a certain
extent this rule overlaps the principle of Anglo-American
3

Adams v. Norris, 23 How. 353, 364 (U. S. 1859).
'Argentine Civil Code, art. 17, Jannin's (1917) translation.
519 Harv. L. Rev. 309 (1906).
6
0'Donnell v. Glenn, 9 Mont. 452, 23 Pac. 1018,8 L. R. A. 629 (1890).
71 East, 220 (Eng. 1801).
8
Fed. Cas. 9,005 (U. S. C. C. D. R. I. 1828).
9
Bell v. Gough, 3 Zab. 624, 662, 663, 666 (N. J. 1852); Davey v.
Turner, 1 Dali. 11 (Pa. 1764); Lloyd v. Taylor, 1 Dal. 17 (Pa. 1768);
Eppes v. Randolph, 2 Call. 125, 152 (Va. 1799) accord.
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law that accepted usages and practices arising within the
jurisdiction are recognized as common law.1" In such a
class of cases there is added "to the sanction of general
recognition the express formulation of judicial and expert
authority" to borrow Sir Paul Vinogradoff's illuminating
phrase. The practice of conveyancers has often been looked upon as expert authority on questions of the law of real
property, persuasive although not binding; and the maxim
communis error has been deemed peculiarly applicable to
such problems." Indeed the maxim seems almost as binding in the law of property as the principle stare decisis, at
least so far as the protection of rights is concerned. That
even common understanding and the practice of conveyancers is not binding on a court was decided in the case
of Ocean Beach Association v. Brinly,"1 2 where it was urged
that the maxim cominunis error facit jus sanctioned a common assumption that the signature of the wife of one of
the proprietors of the eastern district of New Jersey (formerly the Province of East Jersey), was not necessary to
pass lands held by such proprietor free of dower. The
court refused to apply the maxim apparently on the wellgrounded principle seldom mentioned but often implicitly
followed, that while common usage may be allowed to sustain titles it will not be permitted to destroy titles, such as
dower rights. In other words, wherever a fair and reasonable rule of property has been so well established and
widely recognized that many titles depend upon it, it will
not be disturbed by courts except for very cogent reasons.13
1°Addison v. Otway, 2 Mod. 233 (Eng. 1677); Com. v. Knowlton, 2
Mass. 530 (1807); Com. v. Chapman, 54 Mass. 68 (1848); Baker v.
Jordan, 3 Ohio St. 438, 442 (1854); Guardians of the Poor v. Greene,
5 Binn. 554, 558, 560 (Pa. 1813), accord.-An interesting parallelism
is afforded in the civil law jurisdiction of Louisiana where the English
rules of evidence in civil cases, and the law merchant of American
common law States were introduced by usage.-La Dranguet v. Prudhomme, 3 La. 0. S. 83, 86 (c. 1831); McDonald v. Millaudon, 5 La.
0. S. 403, 408-9 (1833).
119 App. Cas. 392, 409 (Eng. 1884).
1234 N. J. Eq. 438, 448 (1881).
1"Hallet v. Forest, 8 Ala. 264, 267 (1845); Pond v. Irwin, 113
Ind. 243, 247 (1887); Croan v. Phelps, 14 Ky. 915 (1893) semble;
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Where the matter is covered by an old statute, the common
error may modify the law in part or complete it; but not
abrogate it.1 4
It is elementary that courts have no power to supply
omissions in legislation ;15 but inasmuch as a glance at many
of the cases cited in these notes will satisfy an observer
that numerous instances of common error consist in the
extension of statutory enactments to analogous situations
not covered thereby, it is clear that usage partakes somewhat of a legislative character from the standpoint of the
common law. In civil law jurisdictions, on the other hand.
the approved methods of statutory interpretation permit
courts of law to place an extensive construction upon legislation in order to supply a casus omissus within the spirit
of an enactment, and thus reach a result similar to that
sometimes attained in common law jurisdictions by means
of a common error. 6 Occasionally a question of common
error may be submerged by a determination that a statute
whose letter is seemingly violated thereby is merely directory and not mandatory.
In general, it may be observed that even where a prevalent doctrine is not well founded in legal reason or technology,
if a change of decision would unavoidably unsettle the
Malonny v. Mahar, 1 Mich. 26 (1847); Burge v. Smith, 27 N. H. 332,
336, 338 (1853); Gleason v. Emerson, 51 N. H. 405 (1871); Kostenbader v. Spotts, 80 Pa. 430, 437 (1876); Reed v. Geddes, 287 Pa. 274
(1926).
1'United States v. Dickson, 15 Pet. 144, 161 (U. S. 1841) semble;
Railway Co. v. Phelps, 137 U. S. 528, 536 (1890) semble; United States
v. Mo. Pac. R. Co., 278 U. S. 269, 277, 280 (1929); Hallet v. Forest,
note (13) supra; Ezekiel v. Dixon, 3 Ga. 146, 153 (1847); Van Loon
v. Lyons, 61 N. Y. 22, 25 (1874); Chestnut v. Shane's Lessee, 16 Ohio
(1847); Dutoit v. Doyle, 16 Ohio St. 400, 407 (1865); Kostenbader v.
Spotts, 80 Pa. 430, 437, (1876); New River Co. v. Hereford Commissioners, 2 H. & N. 129, 139 (Eng. 1857); Ralston v. Hamilton, 4
Macq. 397, 405 (Eng. 1862) semble; Calwell v. McLaren, 9 App. Cas.
392, 409 (Eng. 1884) accord.
15United States v. Union Pac. R. Co., 91 U. S. 72, 85, 86 (1875).
ISThis obsolete principle used to obtain in common law jurisdictions under the designation "equitable construction", or under the
guise of applying "the equity of the statute".
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titles of great numbers of persons or create a wide-spread
disturbance of business, such consideration would present
a strong case for the application of the maxim communis
error or the principle stare decisis. Some courts have gone
so far as to hold that they have no power to make a change
of decision which might affect existing contracts." Where
such is the case, a common error which has received the
guinea stamp of judicial adoption could only be eradicated
by prospective legislation. As a rule public policy would
require that courts should hesitate to overrule precedents
where contracts have been made in reliance upon a decision, even where based upon a common error ;"B but it is
believed that such considerations do not apply to usages
opposed to the law merchant.1 9
As Dr. Lieber has observed in his somewhat neglected
work on Hermeneutics, the certainty of law is next in importance to its justice. Sometimes rhetorical language is
found in opinions to the effect that certainty in the law
is of more importance than justice; but it will generally
appear from the context that where such a statement appears, it has been found expedient to adhere to a rule
which works substantial justice in a majority of cases
although found to work hardship in an exceptional case.
At the same time it must be admitted that widely prevalent rules are to be found embedded in Anglo-American
law which are exceedingly unsatisfactory; such as that of
Dumpor's Case 20 "at which the profession have wondered,"
and Coke's invention, actio personalis cur persona mnoritur,
which, in spite of many engrafted exceptions, still works
mischief in the teeth of legislation aimed at the eradication
of its doctrine. Sometimes a troublesome rule is gradually
and by almost imperceptible degrees altered by distinguishing a leading case in which it has been formulated until
17Harnion v. Auditor, 123
Ind. 182; Thomas v. State, 76
18 In re Wallis, 25 Q. B.
dence (1916 ed.) 166.
19
Corn Exchange Bank v.
204

Co. 119b (1613).

Ill. 133 (1887); Haskett v. Maxey, 134
Ohio St. 341, 361 (1907).
D. 176, 180 (1890); Salmond, JurispruNassau Bank, 91 N, Y. 74 (1883) semble.
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transmuted into a form found to be more just and satisfactory.21

There are two extreme schools of thought on

this subject. One which contends that a blunder consecrated by time must be amended by the legislature, and the
other that courts should be prompt to admit and correct
judicial error. A few States require their highest court
to report to the legislature such changes in the law as are
found to be desirable. All jurisdictions require courts of
the first instance and intermediate courts to follow the last
applicable decision of their appellate superiors regardless
of personal opinion as to its soundness.

2

1

Some principles

are so deeply established that courts have no power to
abolish them ;23 and it needs no citation of authorities to
show that where the balance of social or public convenience, to §ay nothing of the requirements of sound judicial policy, demand retention of a rule, such considerations will be deemed conclusive; and alteration or amendment left to the discretion of the legislature whose action
being prospective would not have harmful results.
The doctrine of common error does not apply to antisocial notions regarding the law. Hence it is almost a
universal rule that ignorance of the law is no excuse for
crime.24 Accordingly it was decided in the case of Wallis
v. Mease,-2 that common opinion to the effect that a certain
class of felony was merely a civil trespass, is no ground for

application of the maxim, communis errorfacit jus. As a general proposition it may be postulated that the doctrine of common or universal error does not apply to criminal law or
procedure even where such error has been prevalent among
judges as well as the legal profession. Thus, the widely
prevalent English rule that an acquittal after trial on an
21

Wills v. Manufacturers N. Gas Co., 130 Pa. 222, 232, 234 (1889).
"2McKean, The Rule of Precedents, 76 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 481,

486 (1928).

- 3Aud v. Magruder, 10 Cal. 282 (1858); Paul v. Davis, 100 Ind.
422 (1884); Francis v. Telegraph Co.; 58 Minn. 252, 59 N. W. 1078
Dicey, Law and Opinion in England (1914) 488.
(1894);
2
4McKean, Presumption of Legal Knowledge, 12 St. Louis L.
Rev. 96, 97 (1927).
253

Binn. 546, 550 (Pa. 1811).
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insufficient indictment may be followed by an indictment
for the same offense, was rejected in the case of United
States v. Ball,2 6 although widely accepted in American
jurisdictions. There is no vested right in erroneous precedents in criminal law ;2 and courts will not hesitate to
discard a practice, usage or belief, in criminal procedure,
which is demonstrated to be unfair, unworkable or otherwise unsatisfactory.

28

The underlying policy is different in civil practice from
that of the criminal law, for common error, opinion or
usage will sanction methods of civil procedure, especially
where hallowed by lapse of time and general acquiescence,
and particularly where experience has shown that there
has been no inconvenience occasioned thereby.29 If, however, a case should arise wherein strict adherence to a rule
of procedure would work injustice, courts have the power
to relax or modify such rule regardless of its antiquity ;"O
but wherever a practice ensures reasonable order, certainty
and celerity in the conduct of legal business, and is fair
and just in its purpose and results, questions as to its
theoretical correctness would carry no weight wtith a
modern court of law. Much fallacy lurks in the literal
application of many a Latin maxim, including the subject
of these notes, which is supposed to be an invention of Sir
Edward Coke. As an instance, the scantily reported case
1 sanctioned the issue and enof East India Co. v. Skinner,3
forcement of a warrant to break down doors in case of
opposition, in order to distrain for taxes not yet due, ad26163 U. S. 662 (1895).
2"State v. Mathews, 143 Tenn. 463, 226 S. W. 203 (1920).
2
-United States v. Ball, supra, note 26; O'Connell v. The Queen,
11 Cl. & F. 155 (1844).
29
Hallet v. Forest, 8 Ala. 264, 267 (1845); M'Ginnis v. Lillard's
Exr. 4 Bibb. 490 (Ky. 1817); Lewis v. Jones, 1 Ashm. 53 (Pa. 1823);
Dougherty's Estate, 9 W. & S. 189, 196 (Pa. 1844); Watson v. Willard,
9 Pa. 89, 93 (1848); Eshelman v. Shunan's Admr., 1 Har. 560 (Pa.
1850); Hazard v. Martin, 2 Vt. 77, 84 (1829); Jones v. Hobson, 2 Rand.
483, 501, 502 (Va. 1824); 4th Inst. 240.
30
McKean, The Rule of Precedents, 76 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 481,
496 (1928).
8t Comberbach 342 (7 Wm.III),
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mittedly in violation of strict law, but upheld on the ground
that "the Practice having been in this Case of Taxes to
grant such a conditional Warrant to distrain; Communis
Error facit jus." Such a decision acquiesces in a breach
of the old English common law principle that the law is
above the Government, sanctions a violation of the venerable principle of due process of law, and approves of tyrannical injustice. Surely this is a fitting instance "where an
old case is contrary to the principles of the general law"
and "the Court of Appeal ought not to shrink from overruling it even after a considerable lapse of time". In
American law the question goes deeper than the letter of
the Constitution for "the fourteenth amendment prohibits
a State from depriving any person of life, liberty or property without due process of law, but this adds nothing to
the rights of one citizen as against another. It simply
furnishes an additional guaranty against any encroachment by the States upon the fundamental rights which belong to every citizen as a member of society. As was said
by Mr. Justice Johnson . .. it secures 'the individual from
the exercise of the powers of government, unrestrained by
the established principles of private rights and distributive
justice.' . . .,3 In deciding political questions emphasis is
34
placed on contemporaneous and practical construction
Our historic fiction under which Presidential Electors are
bound by convention to cast pre-instructed votes, and many
other political usages contrary to the express language of
the Constitution, may be supported as Constitutional usages-unwritten Constitutional usages-defendable upon
the ground of necessity, convenience, utility, fairness and
overwhelming popular sanction and acquiescence,-"shaped
by the cooperative action of the whole community"-which
it is beyond the power of courts to disturb. It may not be
32

Smith v. Keal, 9 Q. B. D. 340, 450 (1882), Jessel, M. R.

33United

States v. Cruikshank, 92 U. S. 542, 554 (1875) Waite,
C. J.
34Tyler v. Flanders, 58 N. H. 371 (1878) Doe, C. J.; Cronise v.
Cronise, 54 Pa. 255, 261 (1867) Agnew, J.; Bethlehem v. Allentown,
275 Pa. 110, 115 (1922), Moschzisker, C. J.

DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
considered extravagant to suggest that such usages are law
by unanimous consent.
That custom is the best expounder of the law may be
traced back to the time of Tribonian. 5 The principle has
been expressed in many forms, and is at the base of the
rules regarding administrative construction in the interpretation of statutes. . . . "In the construction of a doubtful
and ambiguous law, the contemporaneous construction of
those who were called upon to act under the law, and were
appointed to carry its provisions into effect is entitled to
very great weight, . . . "" and "in a case of doubt ought to
turn the scale."3 7 If an act is obscure in its terms "communis error facit jus ;"8 but "where a statute . . . is clear
and free from all ambiguity ... the letter of it is not to be
disregarded in favor of a mere presumption as to what is
termed the policy of the government, even though it may
be the settled practice of "an executive department." 39 And
where an administrative construction is not in conformity
to the true intendment and provision of a statute it will not
be permitted to conclude the judgment of a court of
justice. 40 It being elementary that where no ambiguity
exists there is no room for construction, (and necessarily
no place for application of the maxim communis error,) it
has been decided in United States v. Missouri Pacific Railway
Co.," that courts are not bound by a definitely settled administrative construction of a statute.
Cautiously worded statements in many modern treatises on Constitutional Law indicate that there are cases in
which common error will determine questions of the constitutionality of statutes; but it is believed that such views
are archaic. As Mr. Justice Simpson has pointed out in the
3
.1D.
36

I. 3, 37.
Edwards' Lessee v. Darby, 12 Wheat. 206, 210 (U. S. 1827)
Trimble, J.
37
Brown v. United States, 113 U. S. !68, 570 (1884) Woods, J.
"8Turk v. McCoy, 14 Serg. & R. 349, 352 (1826) Rogers, J.
3
St. Paul etc. Ry. Co., 137 U. S.528, 536 (1890).
"United States v. Dickson, 15 Pet. 141, 161 (U. S. 1841).
"1278 U. S. 269, 277, 280 (1929).
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case of Heisler v. Thomas Co., 42 for a court to decide a question of constitutionality otherwise than in accordance with
its mature judgment is to violate its "duty to support the
Constitution as the supreme law." The modern view has
been clearly set forth in Kucker v. Sunlight Oil & Gasoline
Co.,C as follows:
While a court should hesitate to declare a statute
unconstitutional until clearly satisfied of its invalidity
and where it has been on the statute books for many
years the hesitation should be all the greater, yet, if
such an act is plainly in conflict with the organic law
of the state, old age cannot give it life, and when the
issue of its constitutionality is properly raised, it must
be declared void. 4 '
This position is strongly supported by the action of the
Supreme Court of the United States in the celebrated case
of Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Company," in which a
long line of cases dating back to the early days of the Republic, supported by the consensus of opinion of text-books
on Constitutional Law, was unequivocally overruled; thereby establishing the principle that neither stare decisis nor
common error will sustain a view of Constitutional Law
found to be incorrect.
It has been observed that "the expression of legal rules
in customs and judicial determinations has always a casuistical and indefinite character;" that "legal customs as well
as judicial precedents are gradually formed to the extent
42274 Pa. 448, 453, 118 At!. 394, 24 A. L. R. 1215 (1922); affirmed

260 U. S.245 (1922).
41230 Pa. 528, 79 At!. 747, Ann. Cas. 1912A (1911)-Moschzisker, .1.
v. Langham, 34 Ala. 311, 334 (1859); San Francisco v.
Spring Valley Water Works, 48 Cal. 493 (1874); Anderson v. State,
42 Ga. 9,32, 34 (1871); Fergus v. Brady, 277 l1. 272, 115 N. E. 393,
Ann. Cas. 1918B (1917); Commissioners v. Bridge Co., 109 Md. 1
(1908); Stumpf v. Storz, 156 Mich. 228 (1909); People v: Allen, 42
4"Sadby

N. Y. 378, 384 (1870); State v. Bea or, 66 Ohio St. 491, 507, 50
(1902); Hamann v. Heekin, 88 Ohio St. 207, 102 N. E. 730, Ann. Cas.
1915A 1058 (1913); accord.
45158 U. S.601 (1895).
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that there is call for the application of legal rules to special
and definite cases ;" and that "legal rules cannot therefore
find in these forms and expressions that which is at the
same time precise and general."" It has also been noticed
that courts endeavor "to hold a just middle way between
excess of valour and excess of caution" in the solution of
legal problems, for "a too daring expounder is in danger of
laying down sweeping rules without attending to the probable variations in the circumstances to which they will be
applied; and then the application of this rule may have to
be confined within tolerable bounds by a series of qualifications which leave it, to use a classical description, well
nigh eaten up by exceptions.' 7 On the other hand, the
pedestrian timidity that shrinks from hazarding any general conclusion will only leave us in a still less desirable
state, that of having no principle at all, but a heap of unrelated instances which those who come after may or may
not find to be consistent with one another."'48 In view of
these considerations it is gratifying to find that in the
course of deciding the hard-fought case of O'Donnell v.
Glenn,49 one of the contestants endeavored to sustain a view

on the ground of common error, Mr. Justice De Witt, of
the Supreme Court of Montana, found it necessary to lay
down a few rules which clear considerable ground. These
rules, eight in number, are as follows:
1. The common error must be one having some
judicial or professional recognition, proved or tolerated by decisions of judges, or to put the rule less
positively, such judicial or professional recognition

#6Korkunov, General Theory of Law, (Hastings' translation) 425
(1909).
47Cornpare article E of the Code Napoleon, "The judges are forbidden to pronounce, by way of general and legislative determination,
on the cases submitted to them."
"'Pollock, Judicial Caution and Valour, 45 Law Quarterly Review,
293, 296 (1929).
499 Mont. 452, 461 (1890).-The annotations are those of the
present writer.
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adds to the law-making force of the common error. 0
We further qualify the rule, in this, that common
error may possibly have the law-making power, when
supported by lay opinion only, provided that other rules
may be forcibly applied."
2. Courts will not lightly or inconsiderately allow
a common error to subvert a rule of law or abrogate
a positive statute.52
3. The error must be a universal or a very general one. The nearer universal, the more forcibly will
it address itself as a lawmaker to the approval of the
courts.5 3
4. The acquiescence in the common error has involved, or there depends upon it large property interestS.

4

5. The error must be one that people have relied
-5 McKeen v. Delancy's Lessee, 5 Cr. 22 (U. S. 1809); Hallet v.
Forest, 8 Ala. 264, 267 (1845); Davey v. Turner, 1 Dail. 14 (Pa. 1764);
Lewis v. Jones, I Ashm. 53 (Pa. 1823); York's Appeal, 110 Pa. 69, 78
(1885) semble; King v. Inhabitants of Eriswel, 3 Term Rep. 707, 725
(Eng. 1790); Reg. v. Justices of Sussex, 2 B. & S. 664, 680 (Eng.
1862) ; Foakes v. Beer, 9 App. Cas. 605, 629, 630 (Eng. 1884) ; Salmond,
Jurisprudence, (1916 ed.) 166; accord.
"'Tyler v. Flanders, 58 N. H. 371, 373 (1878), Doe, C. J.; Baker
v. Jordan, 3 Ohio St. 438, 441, 442 (1854); accord. Ocean Beach
Assn. v. Brinly, 34 N. J.. Eq. 438, 448 (1881) contra.
"2United States v. Mo. Pac. R. Co., 278 U. S. 269, 277, 280 (1929);
Van Loon v. Lyons, 61 N. Y. 22, 25 (1874); Caldwell v. McLaren, 9
App. Cas. 392, 409 (Eng. 1884); accord.
63
Malonny v. Mahar, I Mich. 26 (1847); Dutoit v. Doyle, 16
Ohio St. 400, 407 (1865); Turk v. McCoy, 14 Serg. & R. 349, 352
(Pa. 1826); accord.
54
Manchester v. Hough, 5 Mason 67, Fed. Cas. 9,005 (1828), Story,
J.; In Matter of Will of Warfield, 22 Cal. 51, 71 (1863) semble; Croan
y. Phelps, 14 Ky. 915 (1893); Burge v. Smith, 27 N. H. 332, 336, 338
(1853); Kirk v. Dean, 2 Binn. 341, 345 (Pa. 1810); Davey v. Turner,
1 Dall. 11 (Pa. 1764); Lloyd v. Taylor, 1 DalI. 17 (Pa. 1768); Eppes v.
Randolph, 2 Call. 125, 152 (Va. 1799); Tamblin v. Crowley, 99 Wash.
133, 138 (1917); Pugh v. Golden Valley Ry. Co. 15 Ch. D., 330, 334,
335 (Eng. 1880); accord.
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and acted upon and have fixed their rights and positions.55
6. The longer the error has existed the greater
force it has. 50
7. The error must be clearly proved.57
8. The error must be in the observing, construing
or interpreting of law" and not an error in directly
disobeying and abrogating that which is law.59
Many judges have taken care to remind us that legal
certainty is of more importance than theoretical correctness; but, as in general, courts will not hesitate to overrule
cases which are not only erroneous but tend to work in55
Manchester v. Hough, supra note 54; M'Ginnis v. Lillard's Exr.
4 Bibb. 490 (Ky. 1817); Malonny v. Mahar, supra note 53; Gleason
v. Emerson, 51 N. H. 405 (1871); Chesbut v. Shane's Lessee, 16 Ohio
599 (1847); Kirk v. Dean, 2 Binn 341, 345 (Pa. 1810); Kostenbader v.
Spotts, 80 Pa. 430, 437 (1876) ; Pugh v. Golden Valley Ry. Co., supra
note 54; Smith v. Keal, 9 Q. B. D. 340, 350 (Eng. 1882), Jessel, M.
R.; accord.
5GMcKeen v. Delancy's Lessee, 5 Cr. 22 (U. S. 1809); Gleason v.

Emerson, 51 N. H. 405 (1871); Chesnut v. Shane's Lessee, 16 Ohio,
599 (1847); State v. Frear, 138 Wis. 536 (1909); Exparte Willey, 23
Ch. D. 118, 127 (1883); accord.
"t Lewis v. Jones, 1 Ashm. 53 (Pa. 1823); Janovrin v. De La Mare,
14 Moo. P. C. 334, 348 (1861) ; Queen v. Justices of Sussex, 2 B. & S.

664, 680 (1862); accord.
5Hallet v. Forest, 8 Ala. 264, 267 (1845); Jack v. Shoemaker, 3
Binn. 280 (Pa. 1810); Turk v. McCoy, 14 Serg. & R. 349, 352 (Pa.
1826); Dougherty's Estate, 9 W. & S. 189, 196 (Pa. 1844) Gibson, C.
J.; Kostenbader v. Spotts, 80 Pa. 430, 437 (1876); Hazard v. Martin,
2 Vt. 77, 84 (1829); State v. McKinney, 28 Va. 42, 60 (1829); accord.
49St. Paul etc. Ry. Co., v. Phelps, 137 U. S. 528, 536 (1890); San
Francisco v. Spring Valley Water Works, 48 Cal. 493 (1874); Ezekiel
v. Dixon, 3 Ga. 146, 153 (1847); Anderson v. State, 42 Ga. 9, 32, 34
(1871); County Commissioners v. Pocomoke Bridge Co., 109 Md. 1
(1908); Ham v. Sawyer, 83 Me. 37 (1854); State v. Wrightson, 56
N. J. L. 126, 206 (1893) semble; Van Loon v. Lyons, 61 N. Y. 22, 25
(1874); Jones v. Hobson, 2 Rand, 483, 501, 502 (Va. 1824); Lawrence
University v. Outgamie Co., 150 Wis. 244, 136 N. W. 619 (1912);
O'Connell v. The Queen, 11 Cl. & F. 155, 373 (Eng. 1844); New River
Co. v. Hereford Commissioners, 2 H. & N. 129, 139 (1857) Pollock,
C. B.; Jones v. Tapling, 12 C. B. N. S. 826, 847 (Eng. 1862); accord.
State v. Tawney, 83 Kan. 597, 602, 603 (1910)-Contra.
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justice,6 ° the maxim Communis error facit jus .
will
not sustain "a rule which in its tendency is calculated to
foster bad faith and defeat the purpose of justice," even
though followed by many reported cases, elementary books
and abridgments.6 '
60Hauser
6 1Leavitt

v. York Water Co., 278 Pa. 387 (1924), Simpson, J.
v. Morrow, 6 Ohio St. 71, 67 Am. Dec. 334, 336, 338

(1856).-Harvey v. Tama County, 53 Iowa 228, 233 (1880), accord.
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